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The People’s War:
A Chronological Look at the Great Patriotic War
Through the Lens of Soviet Propaganda
Nick Ellis

“Glory to the Soviet troops, who hoisted the banner of victory over Berlin!”

Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War was
necessary to rally not only troops, but also the entire population in
order to combat the advancing German forces. Propaganda was
presented in many different forms: posters, music, policies,
speeches and declarations, and even fighting tactics. Though some
Historical Perspectives, Series II, Volume XXIV, 2019
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propaganda was ineffective, wartime propaganda and policies
played an integral part in holding the Soviet Union together during
the Great Patriotic War and had lasting effects on public memory
of the conflict.
Setting the Stage:
Pre-War Propaganda and Operation Barbarossa
Before Operation Barbarossa began in June 1941, Stalin led
the Soviet Union in a massive attempt to industrialize and
modernize the country in order to compete with western capitalist
nations and potentially fend off any attacks from the West. During
this time, Stalin also enforced his unpopular policy of
collectivization and conducted purges against potential political
enemies and “enemies of the people.” Stalin’s prewar policies
greatly affected the Soviet Union’s initial response to German
invasion in three major ways: the military was ill-managed, Soviet
citizens were already fighting a war of preparation, and the
collective was emphasized over the individual.
When Wehrmacht forces invaded the Soviet Union in the
summer of 1941, it was not much of a surprise that war had come.
Stalin expected Hitler to invade for some time, which may have led
him to use Poland as a buffer state in earlier years. During the war
of preparation, propaganda alerted citizens to be ready “if
tomorrow brings war.” 1 Interestingly, the biggest shock when war
broke out was how the Red Army responded. Troops were
mismanaged and many fled when they heard about the German
blitzkrieg. According to Red Army soldier Samoilov, “We were all
expecting war … but we were not expecting that war.” 2 During
Stalin’s purges, many experienced officers were removed, and a
culture of scapegoating and lying developed in response. This left
Choi Chatterjee, Lisa A. Kirschenbaum and Deborah A. Field, Russia's Long Twentieth
Century: Voices, Memories, Contested Perspectives (London; New York: Routledge,
2016), 133.
2 Catherine Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, (New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 88.
1
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the army with mostly inexperienced and irresponsible officers who
had not developed the leadership skills necessary to respond. As a
result, the Red Army was disorganized and scattered across the
western border allowing the Wehrmacht to advance rapidly, take
many prisoners, and destroy much of the Soviet Union’s
infrastructure and supply lines.
Despite the Red Army’s striking losses, many Soviet citizens,
men and women, patriotically enlisting in the Red Army to
respond to the imminent, threat largely thanks to the emphasis on
the collective and the war of preparation. A secret police report
noted, “The workers feel a profound patriotism. There have been
significant numbers of applications to join the army from young
people from the cities and the farms.” 3 It is important to note that
many of these enthusiastic volunteers were often ethnically
Russian. Many ethnic minorities, such as Ukrainian nationalists,
saw the German invasion as a chance to escape Soviet
collectivization, and often welcomed German soldiers early on.
This is not meant to diminish the role ethnic minorities played in
the Great Patriotic War, but to show that not everyone was
enthusiastic about joining the Red Army.
As a result of Stalin’s pre-war purges, collectivization, and
the state’s brutal emphasis on the war of preparation, the Soviet
Union suffered major tactical losses when the Germans invaded.
At the same time many citizens seemed to experience a sudden
surge of patriotism despite the demoralizing defeat. Years of
exposure to collective Stalinist propaganda seemed to train scared
citizens to look to Stalin for leadership and work harder to defend
their motherland against the Soviet Union’s arch-nemesis, fascist
Germany. Even so, much of the Red Army had lost its morale and
the Soviet Union was left in shock as German troops rapidly
gained more ground.

3
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Repairing the Broken Propaganda Machine of 1941
Although there was a notable movement towards greater
participation in the war by citizens, early Soviet propaganda
seemed to be ineffective in conjuring much of this support. At the
time, Soviet propaganda generally consisted of calling for defense
of the Soviet Union and obedience to Stalin – the kind of
propaganda citizens were used to hearing. In fact, many Red Army
troops and civilians had grown skeptical of state reports on the war
because they had already lost trust in the state due to the paranoia
of the purges and forced collectivization. Instead of fighting
explicitly for the Soviet Union or for Stalin, many soldiers often
fought out of fear of execution by a politruk or the NKVD, anger at
the world, the need to prove their masculinity, or for the love of
their hometown. Many Red Army troops also chose to fight to the
death instead of being taken captive after hearing about the fates of
the Wehrmacht’s prisoners. 4 At the time, state propaganda did not
address these motives for fighting and its propaganda often did not
have the desired effect. Outside of state propaganda, a tactic that
did work for boosting troop morale was their signature “Urah!”
shout during charges. This not only struck fear into the hearts of
the enemy, but also worked to unify and excite Red Army troops
as they shouted together.
The state had to reform its propaganda’s focus and strategy if
Stalin was to succeed in his propaganda war. According to
Merridale, “Over a thousand writers and artists joined the
campaign to report [on] the front … Their work was controlled by
yet another new body, the Sovinformburo.” 5 The state soon learned
their overuse of terror was losing its effectiveness. Though many
troops still fought fearing punishment, others simply did not care
as they already considered themselves dead. Early on, many
officers either refused to execute soldiers out of fear of losing
numbers or executed too many soldiers which brought Red Army
Chatterjee, Russia's Long Twentieth Century: Voices, Memories, Contested
Perspectives, 137.
5 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 189.
4
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morale to a dangerous low. As a result, the state focused more on
building their troops’ morale up instead of forcing them into battle.
Much of this reform came from loosening Stalin’s grip on military
leaders (something Hitler could have learned from) and increasing
freedoms in general. By granting military leaders more autonomy,
they were able to better execute their own strategies without being
micromanaged directly by Stalin and the state. In a sense, this
allowed “the experts” to handle their affairs more effectively.
Much of the Red Army’s morale was also boosted when they were
allowed to worship and even receive religious blessings. 6 For
many, this increase in freedoms signaled that perhaps the state
would end collectivization in due time. Regardless of when
collectivization would end, this brought more hope to Soviet
civilians and Red Army troops.
In addition to loosening Stalin’s grip, Soviet propaganda
began emphasizing the Motherland over the Soviet Union and
Stalin. This was the start of the Russian-centric image of the Soviet
Union that would prioritize stories of pre-Bolshevik and Russian
Civil War heroics and continue to grow in the post-war years. The
use of “Motherland” is strategically interesting because “calling
her children to war, rodina-mat’ stood on the blurred border
between spontaneous defense of home and family and obedient
service to the Stalinist state.” 7 Essentially, by creating a parental
figure (rodina-mat’) to represent the Soviet Union, Father Stalin
could indirectly manipulate citizens to sacrifice for the
Motherland. To represent a more aggressive nationalism, slogans
like Pravda’s masthead, “Proletarians of all lands, unite!” were
changed to “Death to the German invaders!” 8 Songs like “The
Sacred War” were also written to emphasize unity in defending

Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 132.
Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, "'Our City, our Hearths, our Families': Local Loyalties and
Private Life in Soviet World War II Propaganda," Slavic Review 59, no. 4 (Dec 1, 2000),
846.
8 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 132.
6
7
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one’s homeland against the Germans. Author of the song,
Lebedev-Kumach wrote:
“Rise up enormous country
Rise to the struggle of life and death
Against the fascist forces of darkness,
Against the cursed horde!
Let the noble fury
Boil up like a wave,
The people’s war has begun,
The holy war!” 9
This song reflected an additional focus on stirring up
emotions of anger and unity against the Germans. Anger, revenge,
and Russian excellence were also reflected in new military
machinery. The BM-13-16 multiple rocket launcher was a weapon
famously dubbed “Katyusha” or “Stalin’s Organ” for the panicinducing sound it made and the fear it struck into German troops. 10
The name “Katyusha” comes from the Russian folk song about a
woman who is waiting for her beloved soldier to return home. The
Katyusha rocket launchers directly reflected the rage that Red
Army troops felt towards the German invaders: hot anger loudly
and chaotically overwhelming the enemy position. Perhaps this
was why the Katyusha rocket launchers were incorporated into
Soviet propaganda and became legendary.
Partisan troops behind enemy lines helped local villagers and
farmers with their daily work to gain their loyalty and trust.
Partisans also worked to fight German propaganda by destroying it
and distributing Sovinformburo propaganda in its place. To
“remind people of the joys of Soviet life,” partisans would also
hold party meetings and celebrations. The role of the partisans is
often overlooked – partisan fighters played an important role in
Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to
Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 159.
10 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 110.
9
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creating chaos behind enemy lines as well as maintaining Soviet
power in occupied regions. 11
Despite the strategy change in the propaganda war, the
NKVD still continued to purge potential political opponents,
defeatists, and ethnic minorities it deemed untrustworthy. The
propaganda reforms that took place after the stunning defeats of
the Red Army began to reflect more accurately what soldiers were
feeling: rage at the German invaders and concern for their
homeland and families. Regardless of the focus on Russian
contributions, propaganda attitude and public opinion moved
towards viewing the Great Patriotic War as the people’s war for
the homeland.
The Defense of Moscow and Propaganda Leading Up to
Stalingrad
As the German Army Group Center approached Moscow in
the fall of 1941, Soviet propagandists and strategists worked to
raise morale and support for the defense of the city. Morale
reached a dangerous low as Red Army troops continued to give
ground to the Wehrmacht. Much of the Soviet Union expected a
bloody defeat as the Germans approached Moscow. Leningrad was
already under siege and suffering greatly, and now Moscow was
next. As troops were rallied to defend Moscow, many citizens in
the area were also conscripted to build city defenses such as
trenches and tank traps. Some citizens volunteered to join the
Narodnoe Opolcheniye hoping to quickly deter the Germans. Yet
due to low morale, some citizens did not jump at the opportunity to
do this, so the NKVD used force to coerce participation. Though
NKVD coercion seemed to contradict the loosening of the state’s
grip, it remained constant throughout the war. Regardless, having
citizens working side by side to defend their capital certainly
reinforced the concept that this was a people’s war. Stalin himself
remained in Moscow during the defense, “rekindling many
11
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people’s hope.” 12 Having the leader of the Soviet Union remain
with his people to defend Moscow, showed Stalin in a new light –
certainly a more positive light than during the 1930s. In addition to
these efforts to defend Moscow, Stalin learned that Japan was not
interested in fighting a war with the Soviet Union which allowed
him to call in reinforcements from eastern regions. Regardless of
individual motivations for fighting, the fact that the capital was
under attack contributed to both Red Army morale and citizens’
participation. The defense of Moscow was not only a key event in
the war, but also one in which the Soviet Union decisively changed
its style of propaganda to one reflecting the idea of a people’s war
instead of Stalin’s war and focused more on cultivating emotions
of rage towards the Germans.
Moscow’s defense through the muddy and icy winter of
1941-1942 was used as a massive morale booster for the Soviet
people. State propagandists did not let this opportunity go to waste
and took full advantage of the pride in defending the capital of the
Motherland. Indeed, “many military historians consider the
German retreat from Moscow – just days before the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor – the turning point of the war.” 13 By the
summer of 1942, the Germans were gaining substantial ground in
the south near the Caucasus oil fields and by Stalingrad. State
propaganda had a greater sense of urgency that could be noticed in
Stalin’s public speeches. In July of 1942, Stalin released his famed
Order No. 227 which said, “Every officer, every soldier and
political worker must understand that our resources are not
limitless. The territory of the Soviet state is not just desert, it is
people – workers, peasants, intellectuals, our fathers, our mothers,
wives, brothers, and children.” 14 The urgency and frankness of the
General Secretary’s words played to soldiers’ and civilians’
concerns about their families and hometowns. It personified the
Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 119.
Chatterjee, Russia's Long Twentieth Century: Voices, Memories, Contested
Perspectives, 133.
14 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 155.
12
13
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vast expanses of territory that had become occupied by the German
invaders. He continued by announcing the disciplining of troops,
which was famously summarized into the slogan “Not a step
back!” 15 Though this is now an incredibly famous order, many Red
Army troops felt that it was repetitive and stated the obvious.
However, by Stalin explicitly calling for no retreats, it instilled a
new degree of confidence in many Red Army troops as they felt
that Stalin himself was urging them to fight for the Motherland,
especially after Moscow. In a way, the Father of the Soviet Union
was saying, “This is it, make it count.” This policy acted very
effectively as propaganda to tie the Soviet Union together leading
up to the Battle of Stalingrad and onward.
At about the same time, Red Army troops had begun to
develop a new sense of professionalism, which was recognized by
the state and publicized to the populace via propaganda, public art,
and new medals. Perhaps this professionalism was due to the large
numbers of defeats or the relaxing of Stalin’s and politruks’ control
over military strategic affairs. Troops and their leaders now began
to function more as resourceful and “self-reliant fighters.” 16 As a
result, troops took more pride in their skills as they were rewarded
for proficiencies and not political allegiances. Military leaders
were no longer kept on such short a leash and were able to conduct
operations the way they saw fit (with of course, no retreating).
Encouragement for this way of thinking was expressed not only in
the Red Army, but also in propagandized public art, such as the
play Front! by Aleksandr Korneichuk. A review of the play said
that it showed how “nothing in the Soviet land will sustain an
ignorant or unskilled leader – not the personal courage, not honors
from the past.” 17 The play echoed the attitude of the Red Army and
spread the spirit of pride in one’s work to the rest of the Soviet
Union.
Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 156.
Chatterjee, Russia's Long Twentieth Century: Voices, Memories, Contested
Perspectives, 138.
17 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 161.
15
16
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Similar to the Red Army’s focus on skills, civilians might
have also been inspired to work harder than they already were to
churn out more tanks and armaments. As a result of the increase in
weapons and armaments, the Red Army’s confidence was boosted.
The state used additional methods to improve morale such as
awarding more medals to Red Army troops in recognition of
exemplary skills and achievements, and refurbishing troops’
military gear. Many women were recruited to clean the soldiers’
uniforms and improve the Red Army’s look which also proved
successful in improving the Red Army’s self-image. As one officer
wrote, “Nina, don’t worry about our uniforms. … We dress better
these days than any commander from the capitalist countries.” 18 As
a result of the “self-reliant” fighting style, increase in awards, and
refurbished image, Red Army soldiers were not only instilled with
greater confidence than before, but also re-energized in a way that
prepared them for the Battle of Stalingrad.
The state also often used women and their stories in
propaganda to inspire more women to get involved and increase
civilian morale within the Soviet Union. The myth of a young
woman named Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia was featured in Pravda
for sacrificing her life. The story read, “Standing under the
gallows, she tries to rouse the villagers, shouting, ‘Why are you
sad? You should be courageous, you should fight, you should beat
the fascists, you should burn them and poison them!’” 19 Women
participated in the war far more than just in production or cleaning
uniforms.
The Soviet Union recruited women starting in the summer of
1942 initially as medics, but soon after as pilots, snipers, tank
crewmembers, and other positions as well. Many women were
excited to join the front in fighting the German invaders and felt a
duty to do so just as much as men. While women’s participation
itself was used as propaganda to improve recruitment and civilian
Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 162.
Tippner, "Girls in Combat: Zoia Kosmodem'Ianskaia and the Image of Young
Soviet Wartime Heroines," The Russian Review 73, no. 3 (July 2014): 383.
18

19Anja
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morale, propaganda and state policies also attempted to boost the
morale of female soldiers already serving. Since this was the first
time such a large number of women served in combat – 800,000 –
Red Army leaders were not prepared to deal with the different
needs of women, such as properly fitting uniforms and hygiene
products. Male troops also had a difficult time assessing how they
should treat the female soldiers. Bella Isaakovna Epstein wrote,
“When we arrived at the 2nd Belorussian Front, they wanted to
have us stay at division headquarters. Meaning: You’re women,
why go to the front line? ‘No,’ we said, ‘we’re snipers, send us
where we’re supposed to go.’ Then they said, ‘We’ll send you to a
regiment where there’s a good commander, he takes care of
girls.’” 20 These conditions often made life on the front lines
difficult for women which affected morale. One attempt made by
the state to boost female troop morale was to provide 43 mobile
front-line tea shops each equipped with hairdressers, small
cosmetics counters, and supplies of dominoes and checkers. 21
Many women became famous because of their service and were
recognized publicly, such as the women of the 588th Night Bomber
Regiment or “Night Witches” as German soldiers called them out
of fear. Many snipers, such as the famed Roza Shanina, were also
recognized publicly for their skill and contributions to the war. The
stories of units like the Night Witches and many famed snipers
were publicized to increase recruitment numbers and improve
Soviet citizens’ confidence. Unfortunately, women’s efforts as a
collective were never addressed and largely omitted from post-war
propaganda, unjustly erasing their large contributions from the
Soviet memory of the Great Patriotic War.
In the period from 1941 to 1943, Soviet propagandists
learned to change their tactics from primarily employing coercion
and promoting the image of Stalin’s Soviet Union to building up
the Red Army’s confidence, stoking their fury, and promoting a
Svetlana Aleksievich, The Unwomanly Face of War: An Oral History of Women in
World War II (New York: Random House, 2017), 191.
21 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 165.
20
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people’s war based on many soldiers’ actual fighting motives.
Many policies such as the relaxation of the state’s grip, Stalin’s
Order No. 227, and the recruitment of women were also
propagandized and played a key role in boosting the Soviet
Union’s faith in victory over the German invaders.
The Battle of Stalingrad and Onward to Berlin
The hard-fought Soviet victory in Stalingrad created a
massive morale boost for the Red Army and the rest of the Soviet
Union which helped them drive the Germans all the way back to
Berlin. After their defeat in Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht ceased to
gain ground and were now fighting a largely defensive war as the
Red Army continued to push back with growing fury, supplies, and
numbers. Soviet propaganda had played a large part in rousing Red
Army troops’ emotions and pride. The combination of Stalin’s
Order No. 227, the realization that the Soviets were against the
wall now, and the re-framing of the war as the people’s war
worked to turn the Soviets into “some kind of cast-iron creatures,”
as one German put it. 22 Stalin’s slightly loosened grip allowed
Marshal Zhukov to devise strategies such as the encirclement of
General Paulus’s Sixth Army within the city. Ironically, Paulus’s
predicament was largely due to Hitler’s micromanagement of
military forces and refusal of Paulus’s request to break out. 23
Soviet propagandists also used stories of valiant acts during the
battle to rouse soldiers’ strength and show the rest of the Soviet
Union the dedication of the Red Army. One such story told of a
“man in flames leap[ing] out of the trench … run[ning] right up to
[a] German tank, and smash[ing] the bottle against the grille of the
engine hatch. A second later an enormous sheet of flame and
smoke engulfed both the tank and the hero who had destroyed
it.” 24 With regards to the Red Army’s rage, Soviet propaganda
Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 176.
World War II in HD Colour, “Ep 4: Hitler Strikes East.” Television Documentary,
directed by Jonathan Martin (World Media Rights, 2008).
24 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 176.
22
23
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only worked to stoke the flames that were already present and
helped it grow stronger. Many movies were made showing
soldiers’ valiant acts with the press explicitly encouraging the
killing of Germans. Many poets, artists, and writers also published
works that depicted Germans being slaughtered and used humor to
encourage German killings.
Ignoring the Red Army’s self-developed proficiency and
existing rage, the Soviet state took credit for the Red Army’s
successes as proof that those in the Red Army were loyal to the
Party and dedicated to Stalin. Since Stalingrad was “the end of the
most difficult period of the war for the Soviet Union, the press
resurrected the prewar convention of attributing success to the
party bureaucracy and to Iosif Stalin personally.” 25 This shift back
in propaganda style was the early stages of what would eventually
become the celebration of Stalin’s victory instead of the people’s
victory. Regardless of who took the credit, the victory at Stalingrad
worked to destroy the myth of German invincibility and supremacy
and reinforced the idea that the Soviet Union could still be
successful in destroying the German invaders.
Throughout the rest of the war, Soviet propaganda worked on
cultivating the image of the ravaging German and constantly
reminded the Red Army troops of the atrocities committed against
their people. It was a propaganda strategy that would begin with
rage, continue onto dehumanization, and end in the mass-rape and
murder of countless Berlin civilians as well as any Germans caught
along the way. Soviet propaganda’s greatest contribution at this
stage of the war was to strengthen the rage and desire for revenge
that propelled many Red Army troops forward. Soviet
propagandist, Ilya Ehrenburg, wrote, “Not only divisions and
armies are advancing on Berlin, … all the trenches, graves and
ravines with the corpses of the innocents are advancing on
Berlin.” 26 Images of comrades killed in battle and of mass graves
Kirschenbaum, "'Our City, our Hearths, our Families': Local Loyalties and Private Life
in Soviet World War II Propaganda," 826.
26 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 302.
25
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found on the way to Berlin reminded the Red Army of what the
Germans had done to them and why they desired revenge. In fact,
signs in Germany read: “Red Army Soldier: You are now on
German soil; the hour of revenge has struck.” 27 Signs and
propaganda explicitly encouraged Red Army troops to take their
revenge any way they liked. This was the first stage along the road
of propaganda that would lead to the Red Army committing
atrocities in Berlin. All that was needed to mix with this fiery rage
was dehumanization of the enemy by developing a hostile
collective identity.
While returning to a focus on Stalin’s Soviet Union, Soviet
propaganda worked to instill a morality that would allow and
attempt to justify the violence encouraged. Troops were led to
believe that “a soldier washed his neck to sluice the lice, but a
Communist was on a cleansing mission that would end with the
whole world.” 28 This language led troops to associate the German
enemy with lice and encouraged good Communists to cleanse the
world of such fascist lice. This accomplished two things in Red
Army minds: the dehumanization of Germans, and the
collectivization of Germans as a single body of lice that must be
removed. Therefore, when troops encountered Germans, they did
not see an enemy soldier or enemy civilian but the manifestation of
Nazi Germany – the hostile collective identity. This is how such
savage serial-rapes were able to occur. According to Merridale, “It
did not matter, either, if the women were young or old, for the
women themselves were not the main object. The victims of the
gang rapes were just meat, embodiments of Germany, all-purpose
Frauen, recipients for Soviet and individual revenge.” 29 It was the
Sovinformburo and Soviet propagandists that helped lead Red
Army troops to commit these acts. Propaganda images included
one depicting “a German soldier swinging a baby, torn from its
Chatterjee, Russia's Long Twentieth Century: Voices, Memories, Contested
Perspectives, 143.
28 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 303.
29 Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 311.
27
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mother’s arms, against a wall – the mother screams, the baby’s
brains splatter against the wall, the soldiers laugh.” 30 Images
stayed in Red Army troops’ minds and justified for them the serialrapes as a sort of revenge for what the Germans had done.
As Red Army troops stormed the Reichstag, the symbol of
Hitler’s power, they defeated the defense forces and planted a
Soviet flag at the top of the building. The next day, a photographer
would immortalize the moment the Red Army defeated Germany
in Berlin. Soon after, the Red Army celebrated the surrender of
Nazi Germany and looked forward to returning home to their
families as they had all hoped. Many did not return to their
families for months as they were transported to the East to defeat
Japan. Whether or not they knew it, their people’s war had now
become Stalin’s war and the people’s victory had become Stalin’s
victory.
Post-War Propaganda and the Soviet Memory
Almost immediately after the conclusion of the Great
Patriotic War, Stalin re-tightened his grip on the Soviet Union and
sent many troops and ethnic minorities he deemed as traitors to
gulags or had the NKVD execute them. According to Zubkova,
“Stalin tried … to direct the process into the channel that he
needed. He removed himself from the society of we, moved into a
kind of solitude, preserving for himself the right of orchestrating
the process of marking sociopolitical boundaries.” 31 By now, state
propaganda had shifted back to promoting the Soviet Union and
Stalin, however now state propaganda promoted Russia and its
contributions more than other nations or regions within the union.
Many ethnic minorities such as the Ukrainians and those living
along the western border were deemed traitorous and diminished in
the credit they received for participation in the war. Stalin had reestablished his reign, which could be seen in propaganda posters
Merridale, Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945, 313.
Elena Zubkova and Hugh Ragsdale, Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and
Disappointments, 1945-1957 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 30.
30
31
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that depicted Stalin leading the Soviet Union to victory. The
concept of the people’s war was dead now and had been replaced
by Stalin’s war.
In addition to non-Russians, women as a collective were
erased from the record of contribution and reduced to just a
handful of famous individuals. Women were not allowed to take
part in the Victory Day parades. In fact, the first time female troops
marched in a Moscow Victory Day parade was in 2016. 32 Jewish
veterans experienced incredible violence and hatred at the end of
the war. As the Great Patriotic War ended, Soviet views on Jewish
people took an oddly racialized stance. Many newspapers depicted
Jewish people with stereotypical body features (reminiscent of
Nazi propaganda) and a book called Judaizm Bez Prikras was
published demonizing Jews and spreading the rumor that they
could not do manual labor. 33 Such anti-Semitism grew from the
Soviet move to not recognize Jews as a specific group that was
persecuted in the Holocaust because that would promote
“hierarchal heroism.” Instead the state said that the Nazis
persecuted all Soviets regardless of ethnicity or religion. Also,
Jewish soldiers serving on the front lines often hid their identities
so as not to be immediately executed if captured by Nazis. This led
many other soldiers on the front line to believe that there were no
Jewish contributions to the war. 34 Soviet propaganda further
strengthened anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union by omitting any
recognition of collective Jewish contribution – similar to what
happened to women.
Many war crimes were also forgotten with time or omitted
from the records, such as the mass rapes in Berlin and NKVD mass
executions near Poland. After they won the Great Patriotic War,
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state propaganda worked to reestablish Stalin’s sole rule over the
Soviet Union and establish a twisted racialized communism that
excluded non-Russians’, women’s, and Jewish contributions from
the Soviet memory of the war. Instead it was replaced by Stalin’s
outstretched arm, leading the way to victory.
Conclusion: The Role of Soviet Wartime Propaganda
Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War initially
did not seem to work well, but after adjusting strategies to fit the
idea of a people’s war, it became more appealing and often
underscored Soviet citizens’ fears and angers. Soviet propaganda
and policies, though seemingly ineffective, often painted the
environment in which Soviet citizens and Red Army troops
observed and thought about their conditions during the war. For
instance, though the Red Army was on the brink of defeat in
Stalingrad, Soviet propaganda managed to instill confidence in
troops, and Stalin’s Order No. 227 gave troops a sense of urgency
that this was the “end of the line.” Without propaganda’s focus on
cultivating the rage of the Red Army and trumpeting the victory of
Stalingrad, the Red Army might not have made it to Berlin due to
low morale. Though contributing to the Red Army’s victory over
the Nazis, propaganda often also had negative implications as well.
A major example is the level of rage and dehumanization that was
developed and ultimately culminated in state-sanctioned massrapes in Berlin and other war crimes. However, positive or
negative, it is evident that the use of Soviet propaganda was
effective in getting the results Stalin and the state wanted when
applied properly. In fact, propaganda applied during and directly
after the war still affects the way the former Soviet Union
remembers the war today. Though Soviet state propaganda was
incredibly important, it does not and should not diminish the
essential role millions of Soviet men and women played in
defeating Nazi Germany and securing victory in the Great Patriotic
War.
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